A commentary on the election results in Sweden and Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen), Germany, in the past month. Focusing more on the Swedish election, but both elections are of interest and have things to tell us.
I am especially interested in the contrast and the symbolism of two minor parties in the Swedish election, the Swedish-ethnonationalist AfS and the anti-Swedish immigrant-supremacist, Islamicist Nyans party.
The result in Sweden got much sensationalized attention because a so-called “Far Right” party, the Sweden Democrats, gained ground and helped to form the new government. The rest of the story is that: (1.) it was only a modest gain in a fractured multi-party system, not some huge shift from the previous election, (2.) it’s under a Regime and a political-culture with serious commitments to a racial-ethnic-religious policy unfavorable to natives, (3.) the SD has softened its line significantly and is not the one which can really reverse the situation, which would be the smaller rival AfS (Alternative for Sweden) or a successor occupying tha AfS’ political space.
Meanwhile, the election in Germany got little attention, and virtually no attention in the USA. This we might guess is because is because it was a sub-national “state” election. The number of people involved is comparable, as Sweden and Lower Saxony are similar in population.
The geopolitical or geoeonomic implications for Germany were potentially significant. This was also the only statewide election in Germany in 2022 (the Ukraine War year). There are not scheduled to be any elections of consequence in Germany in 2023 at all. In theory there could be a snap election of one kind of another, but they will want to avoid it if possible.
The 2020s have so far been a terrible decade. As one bad development, crisis, or panic after another sweeps across the landscape like a dust-storm, the long-running crisis of the Western world continues.
Who or what is going to save us? With elections we only see hints, glimpses of sunshine at most, of what Western Revival looks like. We look for signs of cracks in the armor of the multiculturalist regimes, weakness or discontent with the para-national ideological super-structure that upholds it all and is led by the overseer and hegemon, the USA. We do see certain good signs in these elections, and it is about some of those I want to write here.
The results: Sweden
Election day in Sweden was September 11, 2022. This is the big one, electing the voting members of the national legislature, the Riksdag, which runs the government in a more direct way than does the U.S. system’s equivalent of Congress. For the Riksdag elects a prime minister from their number, who forms a government of various cabinet-ministers, who in turn are in charge of all forms of policy.
Let me also note that Sweden distinguished itself by refusing to join the Corona-Panic in 2020, and one result of that is that mail-in voting remains banned except for citizens outside Sweden at election time. Early-voting, done in person, was possible two weeks before the election.
The vote: 49% Center-Left, 29.5% Center-Right, 20.5% Sweden Democrats (“far-right,” whatever that means), 1.5% Other (mainly Nyans vs. AfS, as I shall talk about shortly).
- 49%: The four main parties called the “Center-Left.” This includes substantial elements of a harder-Left and all the usual characters which one expects on a ‘Left’ in Europe in the 2010s/20s. Green politics well represented.
Around one-sixth of the vote for the Center-Left coalition now comes from non-Western migrants who got “citizened-in” and have the right to vote. If all migrants present in Sweden were given instant-citizenship including voting rights the day before the election, this coalition would have won comfortably. Institutionally therefore there is a perverse-incentive to keep the migration “gravy-train” rolling, which helps shore up the ideological commitments their chief ideologues have.
- 29.5%: The three main parties called “Center-Right.” All the voters for these parties knew well that their leaders would work with the Sweden Democrats to form a government. It was out in the open, not a secret. So the vote for one of the traditional parties of the Right (Moderaterna, Liberalerna, and Christian Democrats) was also a vote for the Sweden Democrat-inclusive potentially governing coalition. Any person absolutely fanatically opposed to the supposedly “far-right” Sweden Democrats could have protest-voted for a minor party or voted for one of the moderate parties of the Center-Left coalition, in principle.
- 20.5%: The Sweden Democrats
- 0.45%: Nyans, a radical-immigrant party, openly anti-European, immigrant-triumphalist, and “dispossessionist,” with an active “Sweden for Immigrants, Swedes may remain as second-class citizens” platform.
- 0.25%: Alternative for Sweden (AfS), a Swedish-ethnonationalist party which, if electorally viable as a rival to the ideological voting-bloc behind Sweden Democrats (SD), would immediately take a good portion of SD’s vote, as SD has compromised a lot. In this election, the prospect of SD entering power no doubt suppressed a lot of marginal AfS votes. AfS is also actively suppressed by all forces of the regime in Sweden, while SD is now considered a viable partner for the Center-Right.
The grand bargain
Recapitulating a portion of the above: Center-Right (29.5%) + Sweden Democrats (20.5%) = 50%.
When the smoke cleared and the raw-vote is transferred to actual seats in the parliament (including as by excluding minor-party votes), the Center-Right had 103 seats, the Center-Left 173 seats, and the Sweden Democrats 73 seats.
Center-Right 103 + SD 73 = 176 seats, against. Center-Left 173 seats. Result: A small voting majority for Center-Right + SD. Which means they form the government, if the grand bargain held. And so it did.
The new government
The new prime minister is Ulf Kristersson of the largest Center-Right party. His position is entirely dependent on SD support.
Even a few dissidents on the SD side are willing to do so at any juncture, they could bring down the government. Sweden doesn’t have much of a tradition of “snap” elections but in principle it could have them. It would take only two SD dissidents to accomplish this, two of 73. Therefore the Ulf Kristersson government has to honor its agreement with SD.
The declaration by the Center-Right parties in 2022 that they would enter a voting coalition with the Sweden Democrats was a departure from the past.
As with everywhere else, Sweden’s political powers had tried hard to keep the SD “down” and “out,” which was depicted as a soft-ethnonationalist party and all hints of White-ethnonationalism must never be compromised with but attacked and isolated. The “cordon sanitaire” method used to police the domestic-politics of every Western nation applied also to SD. The surprise? SD has now broken out of the cordon-sanitaire. All it took was a performance of 20.5%. Well, that’s not really so. Momentum and consistency matter more than single-results. SD has been doing better and better each election, in a multiparty system since the late 2000s. It took 20.5% of the total vote plus 15 years of consistent strength, despite the cordon-sanitaire in place.
The “20/20” formula for success
We have an outline for how a European soft-ethnonationalist party in a proportional-representation system can break through and shift the Overton Window. In SD’s case, it is two “20’s”: Consistency, applied over 20 years; and a voter-base above 20%. This 20% support level held for SD for most of the period 2015-2022, peaking at 25% in some polls at some moments. Their efforts have been sustained over twenty years, throughout the 2000s and 2010s.
This probably does not apply to the political Sickman of Western Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany. I shall get to Germany’s only election of 2022 below, but for now these remarks: Their version of the Sweden Democrast is AfD. The AfD as a viable political force only traces to late 2015, when support surged as Madman Merkel “waved in” all those Muslim migrants and encouraged as many as possible to come. The migrants, she demanded at the time, were to be brought in with, quote, “no limit.” She was silent on the mass rape atrocity of New Year’s Eve 2015–2016 committed by hundreds of her pet Migrants, and similar crimes which are now a regular occurrence in Germany in the mundane daily news. From this crime against the nation emerged the AfD.
Though the AfD as a party predates that surrealistic and decadent episode in European history I refer to as the Merkel Migrant Crisis, the AfD only became a party with any viability to stick around because of it. AfD speakers demanded Merkel resign and face a treason trial. They demanded the Migrants go back. These were views popular enough to break Germany’s own very-powerful cordon-sanitaire to a degree, and the first major party “to the Right” of the centrist CDU/FDP bloc was born.
The Sweden Democrats’ ascent to major-party status on the Swedish political map predates the Merkel Migrant Crisis, but the Merkel Crisis did “firm up” support for SD to a great degree, guaranteeing that the SD go from, “energetic, fighting, small-medium party” to “medium-big party, impossible to ignore and difficult to marginalize.” Sweden was hit harder by Merkel-Migrants than any other country, including Germany. The average support level in 2015 before the Merkel Crisis was about 15%, but surged to near 25% during the early months of the Merkel Crisis as Merkel-Migrants were waved in multiple thousands every week. Never thereafter did SD ever poll its pre-MerkelCrisis levels again; a certain number became committed SD’ers and remain so.
A reflection on the Merkel Migrant Crisis of 2015-16
Every now and then I think about the insane and decadent Migrant Crisis of 2015-16, caused and enabled and encouraged by Chancellor Merkel acting as a rogue-agent (against the knowledge or consent of her cabinet or advisers), hence the nicknamed the Merkel Migrant Crisis.
It’s a common view that the Merkel Migrant Crisis contributed to both Brexit and the Trump victory for the Republican nomination, as both the Brexit campaign and the Trump campaign for the nomination occurred during the Migrant Crisis, the Brexit vote coming soon after the Crisis seemed to be tentatively over after Europe agreed to huge payoffs to Turkey to block future migrants from entering. Trump’s fluke election as U.S. president was still well within political-memory of the Merkel Migrant Crisis and he made frequent reference to it. A large number of White-Westerners, especially men, became galvanized by the Merkel Migrant Crisis, that much is obvious, and saw a civilizational apocalyptic vision at the time of Migrants taking control of the whole of the husk of our civilization, aided by a high-treason lobby and other nefarious actors. In other words, these people are mortal enemies. People didn’t want to think this, but the 2015-16 crisis made it impossible to ignore. It was the Jean Raspail “Camp of the Saints” vision playing out in real time some forty years after the novel.
What comes to my mind is that the Merkel Migrant Wave was not as extreme as we made it out to be. It was not some sudden U-turn in policy in which out of nowhere a fanatic began dumping millions of nonwhite Migrants onto Europe where none had been there before. The pipeline already existed and had been working in good order for many years.
The Merkel Migrant Crisis was, rather, just an acceleration of long-existing policy by these people, and the insistence that there would be no end until Europe solved world refugee problems. A lot of moderates and politically squishy people out there saw now, viscerally, that Europe’s leaders’ grand-project does seem to be to displace and replace Europeans in Europe with pliable and grinning Migrants from Wherever, celebrating them as morally superior, coddling them as one does children. It is a frightening vision when seen in the light of day, which it rarely is.
The Merkel Crisis was a case of the frog in the pot being boiled who at one point notices an unusual temperature-jump, sees the flabby finger of a dour woman turning up the heat, and asks in his frog-voice, “Hey, what’s going on here?”
The SD itself is no more capable of solving the problem than the frog, though it may stir up quite a fuss and splash around a little. No, actually, let’s update the metaphor. There are multiple frogs in the pot. The pot is Sweden. The frogs are the political forces in Sweden, parties and nonparty political forces. SD is the frog who gets upset and starts making a fuss. The others are annoyed at this malcontent frog. Just enjoy the water, you bigot. What’s wrong with that malcontent wrong? Let’s shun him to one side of the pot. Now there is born a small and weak but feisty little frog named AfS who seeks to jump over the side and shut off the flame, but isn’t strong enough to jump that high, and the fat-and-happy bigger frogs might seek to stop him if he does grow big enough.
To return to the Sweden election results. In the foreign headline-summarized version of events, all the above was reduced to: the “far-right” SD “won” the election.
The unnuanced view that SD “won” (and that SD is “far-right”) is wrong for several reasons. For one thing, the SD will have neither the prime ministership nor any of the cabinet positions (ministries). All the cabinet positions go to members of the Center-Right coalition, by agreement, which represents a nod by the Center-Right to the old gods of the cordon-sanitaire. The SD gets no control of any ministries but under a gentleman’s agreement the new ministries are to pursue policies significantly more moderate on key questions behind the crisis of the West than previously. This is believed to include reduction of migration totals, refugee policy, and nationality/citizenship-granting policy. Possibly Sweden will even deport some fraudulent refugees and criminal migrants.
The new ministers are all sworn in and official as of October 18, 2022. It was a strange in the annals of political history in such parliamentary systems that a party giving more than four-tenths of the necessary votes to bring forward a new government gets no ministries at all. (SD has 73 seats; the Center-Right coalition has 103 seats, the Center-Left has 173 seats. The new government received exactly 176 votes when the new parliament met, as expected.)
Nyans vs. AfS
In some ways the more interesting story in the Sweden election is the comparison of the two radical, ideological minor-parties, Nyans and AfS. Both parties are small, only recently formed, but have coherent total-visions of a political program. They are not single-issue or ‘joke’ parties; they are quite morally serious). They are also new. This is AfS’ second election and Nyans‘ first.
Nyans are immigrant-supremacists, soft-Islamicists, anti-European racialists. Their support is hard-capped at the level of Non-Western Migrants-turned-voters.
AfS, as Swedish-ethnonationalists, have a much higher potential cap, within the native Swedish or European (pro-European) population.
For a time the AfS used this slogan: “Which Sweden will you choose?” (“Vilket Sverige valjer du?“). The black flag of ISIS on the right hosts the logos of the seven big parties inside the white circle. The message: All these parties, of the Center-Left and Center-Right, they are all guilty, tainted, part of the problem, and without solutions or real vision.
The seven symbols on the black flag are the logos of all the major political parties, except one: the SD.
We are not talking about big numbers of voters, but we are talking about ig ideas and visions. Every rational voter for Nyans or AfS knew well that his vote was “wasted,” that his vote would not contribute to any actual seats in the parliament given the “4%-hurdle.” These two parties, AfS and Nyans, therefore represent ideological-cores of movements or political-currents, activist bases.
If they were magically teleported outside the electoral-ghetto, both Nyans and AfS could immediately grow to 10x, 15x, or 20x what their voting-strength was in election 2022, and would be set to grow further from there. If the Center-Left coalition parties move away from support for Migrants, expect parties like Nyans to continue to become active, even if this particular one goes away. If SD fails to turn things around for Sweden as some of its voters may have hoped, expect the AfS or a party like it to continue to attract momentum. Because the new SD-influenced government will not likely turn thing around, To the AfS belongs the political future.
Some say that now that SD is “in the system,” the door will be open for the growth of the AfS (or party like it). The system hopes SD can be coopted and that whatever radicalism there still is with the party can be contained and subsumed. Being a quasi-part of government does indeed put a lot of pressure on the SD to soften even further than it already has.
The leadership of AfS are not people inclined to soften or compromise. They are smart, sharp, hungry, and young. The b.1970s age-cohort among them are the elders of the group. The most common leader figures that emerged when the party was born in the late 2010s were are b.1980s and even b.1990s. One of their more prominent members is Jeff Ahl (b.1987). He was a former SD member of the parliament who left to co-found AfS. Their national-leader, Gustave Kasselstrand, is also b.1987. The party treasurer is b.1986. Other senior party members are born in the early 1990s.
The departure of some key SD figures to form the AfS in the late 2010s symbolized the softening line of the SD. The SD in its infancy was a lot like AfS is today, young men with an ideological commitment to liberation from the multiculturalist-monster. in the SD’s infancy the multicultural-machine was still in its own early stages, and every Swedish adult remembered well a fully-monoethnic Sweden. This is no longer the case. Young adults now grew up in an environment of multicultural-Sweden.
The AfS’ call for mass repatriations and for a firm policy promoting peaceful repatriation among migrants and preventing new migrants from arriving is a radical divergent vision from both regime policy and from the Nyans vision of Sweden as a permanent Migrant flophouse with some second-class tax-cow Swedes to keep the money flowing to first-class-citizen Migrants and Muslims.
As for Nyans, you will not be surprised to learn that its leader is a migrant himself, name of Mikail Yüksel, b.1982 in Turkey, an arrival in Sweden in 2001. On arrival, the then-teenager claimed to be a refugee, and was “waved in” according to the custom of the time. Whatever story he came up with held up enough to get him permanent residency. After that was secured, he began frequently traveling back and forth to Turkey.
Nyans is too new a party to have much of a leadership class. I expect the people behind it (like the “refugee” founder who frequently travels back to the place he had to “flee”) are b.1980s and b.1990s, just as with AfS. The younger Migrants with significant experience in Sweden are imbued with a doctrine of their own moral superiority, which the political-culture preaches. In both cases, the b.2000s people soon to join them as they age-in to politics as the 2020s go forward.
That both AfS and Nyans are youth-driven parties and outsiders allows them a purity of purpose, allows them to face the issues of today head on. Moral-right is on the side of the AfS, of course. Sweden really does belong, by right, to the Swedes and not to the mishmash coalition of migrants and Muslims. (Echoes of the “Somewheres” vs. the “Anywheres” distinction. These Migrants had no reason specifically to go to Sweden except that it offered lots of benefits and waved them in.)
The Nyans party, since its founding, has also been promoted by Turkey’s state-run news agency. Some want to cast Nyans as a pro-Erdogan in some sense (“Pro-Erdogan Islamist party in Sweden sparks concerns,” Nordic Monitor, Sept. 12, 2022). Its broad appeal to migrants in hardcore-immigrant-majority areas is its message of immigrant-supremacism, and many of its voters, I presume, don’t care about Erdogan. Some might, but to focus on Erdogan may miss the point a bit.
The following are all words that to some degree describe Nyans: non-European, anti-European, immigrant-triumphalist, immigrant-supremacist, pro-Black, pro-Muslim, pro-“Middle East North African” (MENA), anti-Swedish or post-Swedish, anti-Christian or post-Christian (the latter not in the liberal-humanist sense), multiculturalist. More passive forms of most of these same ideas are perfectly okay with the regime.
The Nyans party platform (list of demands) and cast-of-characters is lifted from some Jean Raspail or Michel Houellebeq novel. If Jean Raspail wrote other novels picturing a Migrant takeover of Europe, especially by the 2010s (he died in 2020), Raspail might have eventually come up with something like a Nyans party. His successor in the genre, Houllebecq, did depict a Nyans-like party very directly in his Submission novel, and predicted its success, as what force in European politics would or could block such a party?
Taken from the Nyans platform:
- “The Nyans party demands that Muslims and Afro-Swedes be given a special minority status in Sweden’s constitution.”
- “The Nyans party demands that Islamophobia be given a special criminal classification.”
The party also calls for:
- segregation of certain public facilities according to Islamic custom;
- special housing, partly- and fully-subsidized, to be given to immigrants persecuted by racism in Sweden;
- hate-crimes offices to seek out and punish White-racists and Islamophobes who target first- or second-generation Migrants (i.e., to ensure the domestic tranquility by crushing native-Racism).
A number of the top candidates for Nyans made quasi-ISIS-style public comments hostile to Jews and Shia-Muslims. Be that as it may, every person in this party is hostile to the eternal plague of White Racism which daily torments and humiliates all first-, second-, and third-generation Migrants in Sweden.
The Nyans policy platform would create a first-tier of citizens consisting of glorious noble Migrants; a second-class of citizen being undiverse, boring ethnic-Swedes; and a third class of citizen or sub-citizen being Racists, with the hate-crimes panels able to demote an individual from second-class to third-class as needed. The ‘endgame’ is a Sweden purged of the curse of Swedishness and inherited by Migrants.
The Gender Gap
Sweden has a political “gender gap,” in that SD support was more more male than female. It is a familiar problem, much commented on in the U.S. case, but I think generally applicable across the West.
The phenomenon is based on an emergent identity-group of empowered left-wing educated women. Society trains them to believe they are the natural leadership class and that there is a long-running conspiracy by men against them, something like that. They drink this up and come to who base their identity and sense of self on a left-wing politics of grievance and of self-empowerment. It doesn’t really lead them to happiness, and it may resemble some huge political cult akin to a self-help organization. To call back briefly to the Merkel Migrant Crisis, these are the women who held up the “Refugees Welcome” signs.
Exit polls suggest that 29% of ethnic-Swedish men voted SD, against only about 18% of Swedish women. Meanwhile, party-preference surveys in 2020 and 2022 found 23% of men say they prefer SD against only 10% of women. If the exit polls were right, it suggests more women than men concealed their party-preference if it was for SD, suggesting the taboo against the SD is felt more strongly by women than men.
The future of Swedish politics
We can say that “Nyans vs. AfS” to to be the future of Swedish politics. Make that, all Western politics. Make that a ‘future’ already with us. All our politics already has this divide running through it somewhere, though the regimes across the West implicitly favor the Nyans side, even though mostly they just pretend that it will always be the way it was no matter how many Migrants are added and empowered.
What “Nyans vs. AfS” represents is an in-the-open conflict over the question of whether European Man is the rightful owner of Europe, or whether Migrants are morally-superior after all, and a holy replacement of the deplorable European. Will a mishmash of Muslims and Blacks and Whoevers inherit the continent, cheered on by a class of native anti-racism Experts, these often being female and radical-feminists (see: Robin DiAngelo and Heidi Beirich).
Migrants reigning supreme, formally, legally, and explicitly explicitly by the State, which exists to serve them. That is the Nyans vision. The reverse is the AfS vision, in which Nyans supporters and most other Migrants would be put on a Path to Repatriation. Only one side shall win.
To reformulate AfS’ own slogan previously mentioned: Which side are you on?
The results: Lower Saxony, Germany
Lower Saxony, although almost as big as Sweden (in population) and although the only election in Germany in 2022, the Lower Saxony state election in October 2022 got little attention in foreign media coverage. I did not even see it mentioned in U.S. media coverage.
A similar general story can be told as with the Sweden election with the AfD in the place of SD. If the AfD is on the SD’s path, it is at an earlier stage in Lower Saxony. If we apply the “20/20 rule” proposed above, the AfD breakthrough could come in the early 2030s at earliest.
I mentioned the AfD already above in the context of the Merkel Migrant Crisis, which I believe is in important ways the key political event of the 2010s.
The AfD is the equivalent of the Sweden Democrats in Sweden in important ways. The AfS, when it founded itself in the late 2010s, copied the AfD’s name, but is actually a considerably more hardcore and purist revivalist party, equivalent to the ethnonationalist wing of the AfD, which is a minority position within the AfD.
The AfD polled as high as 18% Germany-wide in the late 2010s, which could mean that in a crisis and with the cards falling just right it could have taken one-fourth the seats in a Bundestag election, which would be a deep humiliation for the Berlin regime. The AfD, though, sank to much lower during the Corona-Panic period from March 2020 through mid-2022, usually coming in below 10% during the long Panic, and not doing much better than that in the actual Bundestag election of September 2021. It lost up to half its peak support.
What happened is the Corona-Panic drove less-committed voters towards the safety of support for the government and the ‘regime’ parties. (A lesson: governments in some cases love manageable crises; one is reminded of the old line about government programs being “a solution in search of a problem”).
In September and October 2022, the AfD has recovered almost all its pre-CoronaPanic strength, achieving 15% or better in a number of polls. This I can only interpret to be because the AfD is the main voice against intervention in the Ukraine war, and as long as Germany continues pigheadedly backing the US intervention, the AfD will continue to push towards its high-mark and maybe even exceed it, as winter gets closer. The AfD polling at a steady 20%+ would be deeply worrying to the Berlin regime.
The election Lower Saxony came on October 9th, 2022, right in the middle of this sustained recovery in strength by the AfD, and during the ongoing Ukraine war. Lower Saxony is not and never has been a stronghold for this party. During the Merkel Migrant Crisis, support rose to up to 10% in Lower Saxony but leveled off at about 7-8% and mostly stayed there.
The result in the Lower Saxony Landtag election, October 9, 2022:
- 48%: Regime parties, Center-Left (SPD+Green)
- 33%: Regime parties, Center-Right (CDU+FDP)
- 11%: AfD — the only major opposition party
- 5%: Other dissident or quasi-dissident parties, non-Regime, or anti-Regime (Linke, DieBasis, Freie Waehler, Volt) — (note, DieBasis is the “Corona-denier, anti-vaxx” party, and took 1.25% here). No one expected any of these would get seats, though Linke might have. Their function is more to make a statement.
- 3%: Joke parties or single-issue parties
It turned out that the FDP didn’t make it over 5% and so didn’t get any seats. In actual seats it was SPD 57 seats, Greens 24 seats, CDU 47 seats, AfD 18 seats. Total seats in the new Landtag: 146. SPD+Greens are an easy majority at 81 seats between them (55%).
Overall there is not a major shift here. The change was the strong showing by the AfD and the shift within the Center-Left coalition from SPD to Greens.
As for the Ukraine War, we see in the AfD’s relatively good result (if not great result) a signal of discontent with interventionism and confrontationalism. In Sweden, SD flipped its position on NATO membership (Sweden has never been a member but is now ‘applying’) and in about spring 2022, and began saying they were for it. The AfS now holds the torch of opposition to NATO membership, which the SD used to carry. This is one example of how the SD softened its position.
The AfD benefits in one sense at least by being an opposition party, it can be more honest. SD may have flipped on NATO because it sensed a regime commitment to joining NATO and saw opinion poll s suggesting most Swedes were panicked over the Russia invasion of Ukraine, and knew the election was approaching and that they had a real shot at entering government. The whole deal might be off if they stuck to their non-NATO position. In Germany the AfD doesn’t have this dilemma, for now.
The AfD caused controversy among its own supporters when its Bundestag members appeared to support the Ukraine intervention in August 2022, interpreted by some as a cheap “virtue signal.” Nevertheless, some regular-citizen opponents of the Ukraine intervention will tend to migrate to the AfD, which is what I believe happened in this Lower Saxony election. It was not at all a big-enough movement to get attention or for the “transastlantic” crowd to even notice.
Germany’s problems are considerably bigger than the mere energy problem, and it is unclear if anyone has the solution.
Population comparisons and brief comments on the ethnopolitical situation
Titular-nationality population: ca. 8 million (“Swedes”), persons of either full-Swedish background or part-Swedish and part-close-kindred, fully assimilable background.
Others: ca. 2.5 million
Of the 2.5 million others (non-Swedes), there are said to be over 250,000 of Syrian origin alone, primarily tracing their ‘lineage’ to the Merkel Migrant Crisis of 2015-16. That is up from <50,000 on the eve of the Merkel Migrant Crisis, and up from a low number basically roundable to zero in the 1980s.
By the 1990s, small and secure-seeming beach-heads had been established by this group and others. Similar stories hold for other migrant-groups, with slight changes in chronologies between them. Somalis may number 125,000 today; Iraqis number about 230,000. Turks and Kurds are also in that league, including the founder and leader of the anti-white political party Nyans. Many other groups of non-Europeans have significant numbers in the mid-high tens of thousands.
A small majority of the 2.5 million non-Swedes is non-Western and unassimlable. They often form themselves into that now-recognizable sight, the immigrant “no-go zone” ghetto on the outer fringes of a large city, dependent on “handouts” and regime support and left-wing pressure groups to demand they stay and get kid-glove treatment and handouts. One of the most notorious of these immigrant-dominated areas outside Stockholm is Rinkeby, which by the 2000s had almost totally de-Europeanized. Initial beachheads by migrants and ‘refugees’ were established y the end of the 1980s, and in the 1990s they took the whole place ad Migrants kept coming in. Somalis are the largest group in Rinkeby. Why are they in Sweden? I have no idea.
Rinkeby was near the 90% foreign-origin mark already by the year 2000. Since then, many more Rinkebys or semi-Rinkebys exist, and we stand at the cusp of Rinkebys being the semi-norm in Sweden rather than strange aberrations or out-of-the-way curiosities. Since 2000, the concept of the immigrant-suburb has become a wider phenomenon and almost a cliche in our (Western) political commentary (see also, the banlieue in France). Similar such conditions exist in modified form in the USA, despite occasional references one still hears to the “inner city,” which in many places or in many ways is an anachronism now.
Rinkeby’s vote in 2022, according to a preliminary result: Social Democrats: 30%; Vänsterpartiet (“Party of the Left”): 28%; other parties of the leftist coalition: 8% (total Center-Left, 66%); Nyans: 24%; Center-Right coalition: 8%; Sweden Democrats: 2%.
In the “Rinkeby”-comparable immigrant-supermajority districts outside major cities of Malmo and Gothenburg, Nyans did about the same, taking over one-fourth of the vote.
It would be a mistake to assume all of the 2.5 million of the non-Swedes in Sweden are of the “Rinkeby” type, — i.e. unassimilable, hostile, non-Western, Mideast or African Muslims, inhabiting ghetto’s designated “no-go zones,” whose young men pelt police with rocks for fun while the more ambitious of their number doing bombings, murders, and rapes.
Nyans‘ low total vote (0.44%) is partly because so many of its core supporters are not (“yet”?) voting-eligible citizens but also partly because these hardcore non-Swedish areas are not necessarily the norm.
A portion of the 2.5 million non-Swedes in Sweden are easily assimilable to Sweden in its traditional sense, in the sense universally recognizable of what Sweden was before it built this Migrant pipeline. The definitely-unassimilable element may now exceed 15% of total resident population. The fully-assimilable or the transient-neighbor population (as with Danes, Norwegians, Finns) may reach 4-5%; a gray-area element is another 4-5%.
Sweden has had below-replacement fertility rates since 1968, usually in the 1.75 children/woman range over 55 years now, perhaps more like 1.65 for Swedes. Adjusting for people living longer, still we would expect fewer Swedes today than in 1968 when fertility dropped below replacement. The absolute drop should especially have been felt by the 1990s or so, and every year since. Instead, in the past 25 years Sweden has added nearly 1.7 million residents, a nearly +20% population growth. The Merkel Migrant wave and the chain-migrants that followed directly from it were only as a bump in the long-running trend, say four years’ worth of Migrants dumped in the space of one year.
As we consider this part of Sweden’s story, it seems inevitable that a Sweden Democrat-like political breakthrough would occur, and it is just as predictable that an AfS-like breakthrough will come, will continue in the 2020s.
Titular population (“Germans”): ca. 6.7 million.
Others: 1.4 million.
Of the others, about 400,000 have gained German citizenship (the core of this being Turks), and about 900,000 are foreign citizens.
Of the foreign citizens, around 150,000 of the Merkel Migrant Wave of 2015-16, and by now it must be that a portion of the remainder are chain-migrants from the 150,000 of the Merkel Wave who have stayed.
In 2022, reportedly more than 100,000 Ukrainians are being hosted as golden-ticket ‘refugees’ in Lower Saxony, are officially resident there, and are being funded by tax-monies. Persistent rumor has it that these Ukrainians are often not really ‘resident’ in the place they are registered and go from place to place (including back to Ukraine) but make sure to do just enough to keep the money flowing.
By contrast: The number of Ukrainians arriving in 2022 said to be resident in Sweden as of September 2022 is “only” 45,000. The share of the total resident-population of recently arriving Ukrainians in Lower Saxony is 1.3%; in Sweden, it is “only” 0.4%.
In general the same provisos as discussed for Sweden hold in Lower Saxony’s case, except that the native demographic-momentum situation is worse and the proportion of recent-foreigners is lower (except Ukrainians).