The elections of 2022 in Sweden (nationwide) and Germany (Lower Saxony): Sweden’s AfS vs Nyans a preview of battles to come

A commentary on the election results in Sweden and Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen), Germany, in the past month. Focusing more on the Swedish election, but both elections are of interest and have things to tell us.

I am especially interested in the contrast and the symbolism of two minor parties in the Swedish election, the Swedish-ethnonationalist AfS and the anti-Swedish immigrant-supremacist, Islamicist Nyans party.

(“Which Sweden will you choose” — AfS vs. most other parties)

The result in Sweden got much sensationalized attention because a so-called “Far Right” party, the Sweden Democrats, gained ground and helped to form the new government. The rest of the story is that: (1.) it was only a modest gain in a fractured multi-party system, not some huge shift from the previous election, (2.) it’s under a Regime and a political-culture with serious commitments to a racial-ethnic-religious policy unfavorable to natives, (3.) the SD has softened its line significantly and is not the one which can really reverse the situation, which would be the smaller rival AfS (Alternative for Sweden) or a successor occupying tha AfS’ political space.

Meanwhile, the election in Germany got little attention, and virtually no attention in the USA. This we might guess is because is because it was a sub-national “state” election. The number of people involved is comparable, as Sweden and Lower Saxony are similar in population.

The geopolitical or geoeonomic implications for Germany were potentially significant. This was also the only statewide election in Germany in 2022 (the Ukraine War year). There are not scheduled to be any elections of consequence in Germany in 2023 at all. In theory there could be a snap election of one kind of another, but they will want to avoid it if possible.

The 2020s have so far been a terrible decade. As one bad development, crisis, or panic after another sweeps across the landscape like a dust-storm, the long-running crisis of the Western world continues.

Who or what is going to save us? With elections we only see hints, glimpses of sunshine at most, of what Western Revival looks like. We look for signs of cracks in the armor of the multiculturalist regimes, weakness or discontent with the para-national ideological super-structure that upholds it all and is led by the overseer and hegemon, the USA. We do see certain good signs in these elections, and it is about some of those I want to write here.


The results: Sweden

Election day in Sweden was September 11, 2022. This is the big one, electing the voting members of the national legislature, the Riksdag, which runs the government in a more direct way than does the U.S. system’s equivalent of Congress. For the Riksdag elects a prime minister from their number, who forms a government of various cabinet-ministers, who in turn are in charge of all forms of policy.

Let me also note that Sweden distinguished itself by refusing to join the Corona-Panic in 2020, and one result of that is that mail-in voting remains banned except for citizens outside Sweden at election time. Early-voting, done in person, was possible two weeks before the election.

The vote: 49% Center-Left, 29.5% Center-Right, 20.5% Sweden Democrats (“far-right,” whatever that means), 1.5% Other (mainly Nyans vs. AfS, as I shall talk about shortly).

  • 49%: The four main parties called the “Center-Left.” This includes substantial elements of a harder-Left and all the usual characters which one expects on a ‘Left’ in Europe in the 2010s/20s. Green politics well represented.

    Around one-sixth of the vote for the Center-Left coalition now comes from non-Western migrants who got “citizened-in” and have the right to vote. If all migrants present in Sweden were given instant-citizenship including voting rights the day before the election, this coalition would have won comfortably. Institutionally therefore there is a perverse-incentive to keep the migration “gravy-train” rolling, which helps shore up the ideological commitments their chief ideologues have.
  • 29.5%: The three main parties called “Center-Right.” All the voters for these parties knew well that their leaders would work with the Sweden Democrats to form a government. It was out in the open, not a secret. So the vote for one of the traditional parties of the Right (Moderaterna, Liberalerna, and Christian Democrats) was also a vote for the Sweden Democrat-inclusive potentially governing coalition. Any person absolutely fanatically opposed to the supposedly “far-right” Sweden Democrats could have protest-voted for a minor party or voted for one of the moderate parties of the Center-Left coalition, in principle.
  • 20.5%: The Sweden Democrats
  • 0.45%: Nyans, a radical-immigrant party, openly anti-European, immigrant-triumphalist, and “dispossessionist,” with an active “Sweden for Immigrants, Swedes may remain as second-class citizens” platform.
  • 0.25%: Alternative for Sweden (AfS), a Swedish-ethnonationalist party which, if electorally viable as a rival to the ideological voting-bloc behind Sweden Democrats (SD), would immediately take a good portion of SD’s vote, as SD has compromised a lot. In this election, the prospect of SD entering power no doubt suppressed a lot of marginal AfS votes. AfS is also actively suppressed by all forces of the regime in Sweden, while SD is now considered a viable partner for the Center-Right.


The grand bargain

Recapitulating a portion of the above: Center-Right (29.5%) + Sweden Democrats (20.5%) = 50%.

When the smoke cleared and the raw-vote is transferred to actual seats in the parliament (including as by excluding minor-party votes), the Center-Right had 103 seats, the Center-Left 173 seats, and the Sweden Democrats 73 seats.

Center-Right 103 + SD 73 = 176 seats, against. Center-Left 173 seats. Result: A small voting majority for Center-Right + SD. Which means they form the government, if the grand bargain held. And so it did.

The new government

The new prime minister is Ulf Kristersson of the largest Center-Right party. His position is entirely dependent on SD support.

Even a few dissidents on the SD side are willing to do so at any juncture, they could bring down the government. Sweden doesn’t have much of a tradition of “snap” elections but in principle it could have them. It would take only two SD dissidents to accomplish this, two of 73. Therefore the Ulf Kristersson government has to honor its agreement with SD.

The surprise

The declaration by the Center-Right parties in 2022 that they would enter a voting coalition with the Sweden Democrats was a departure from the past.

As with everywhere else, Sweden’s political powers had tried hard to keep the SD “down” and “out,” which was depicted as a soft-ethnonationalist party and all hints of White-ethnonationalism must never be compromised with but attacked and isolated. The “cordon sanitaire” method used to police the domestic-politics of every Western nation applied also to SD. The surprise? SD has now broken out of the cordon-sanitaire. All it took was a performance of 20.5%. Well, that’s not really so. Momentum and consistency matter more than single-results. SD has been doing better and better each election, in a multiparty system since the late 2000s. It took 20.5% of the total vote plus 15 years of consistent strength, despite the cordon-sanitaire in place.

The “20/20” formula for success

We have an outline for how a European soft-ethnonationalist party in a proportional-representation system can break through and shift the Overton Window. In SD’s case, it is two “20’s”: Consistency, applied over 20 years; and a voter-base above 20%. This 20% support level held for SD for most of the period 2015-2022, peaking at 25% in some polls at some moments. Their efforts have been sustained over twenty years, throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

This probably does not apply to the political Sickman of Western Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany. I shall get to Germany’s only election of 2022 below, but for now these remarks: Their version of the Sweden Democrast is AfD. The AfD as a viable political force only traces to late 2015, when support surged as Madman Merkel “waved in” all those Muslim migrants and encouraged as many as possible to come. The migrants, she demanded at the time, were to be brought in with, quote, “no limit.” She was silent on the mass rape atrocity of New Year’s Eve 2015–2016 committed by hundreds of her pet Migrants, and similar crimes which are now a regular occurrence in Germany in the mundane daily news. From this crime against the nation emerged the AfD.

Though the AfD as a party predates that surrealistic and decadent episode in European history I refer to as the Merkel Migrant Crisis, the AfD only became a party with any viability to stick around because of it. AfD speakers demanded Merkel resign and face a treason trial. They demanded the Migrants go back. These were views popular enough to break Germany’s own very-powerful cordon-sanitaire to a degree, and the first major party “to the Right” of the centrist CDU/FDP bloc was born.

The Sweden Democrats’ ascent to major-party status on the Swedish political map predates the Merkel Migrant Crisis, but the Merkel Crisis did “firm up” support for SD to a great degree, guaranteeing that the SD go from, “energetic, fighting, small-medium party” to “medium-big party, impossible to ignore and difficult to marginalize.” Sweden was hit harder by Merkel-Migrants than any other country, including Germany. The average support level in 2015 before the Merkel Crisis was about 15%, but surged to near 25% during the early months of the Merkel Crisis as Merkel-Migrants were waved in multiple thousands every week. Never thereafter did SD ever poll its pre-MerkelCrisis levels again; a certain number became committed SD’ers and remain so.

A reflection on the Merkel Migrant Crisis of 2015-16

Every now and then I think about the insane and decadent Migrant Crisis of 2015-16, caused and enabled and encouraged by Chancellor Merkel acting as a rogue-agent (against the knowledge or consent of her cabinet or advisers), hence the nicknamed the Merkel Migrant Crisis.

It’s a common view that the Merkel Migrant Crisis contributed to both Brexit and the Trump victory for the Republican nomination, as both the Brexit campaign and the Trump campaign for the nomination occurred during the Migrant Crisis, the Brexit vote coming soon after the Crisis seemed to be tentatively over after Europe agreed to huge payoffs to Turkey to block future migrants from entering. Trump’s fluke election as U.S. president was still well within political-memory of the Merkel Migrant Crisis and he made frequent reference to it. A large number of White-Westerners, especially men, became galvanized by the Merkel Migrant Crisis, that much is obvious, and saw a civilizational apocalyptic vision at the time of Migrants taking control of the whole of the husk of our civilization, aided by a high-treason lobby and other nefarious actors. In other words, these people are mortal enemies. People didn’t want to think this, but the 2015-16 crisis made it impossible to ignore. It was the Jean Raspail “Camp of the Saints” vision playing out in real time some forty years after the novel.

What comes to my mind is that the Merkel Migrant Wave was not as extreme as we made it out to be. It was not some sudden U-turn in policy in which out of nowhere a fanatic began dumping millions of nonwhite Migrants onto Europe where none had been there before. The pipeline already existed and had been working in good order for many years.

The Merkel Migrant Crisis was, rather, just an acceleration of long-existing policy by these people, and the insistence that there would be no end until Europe solved world refugee problems. A lot of moderates and politically squishy people out there saw now, viscerally, that Europe’s leaders’ grand-project does seem to be to displace and replace Europeans in Europe with pliable and grinning Migrants from Wherever, celebrating them as morally superior, coddling them as one does children. It is a frightening vision when seen in the light of day, which it rarely is.

The Merkel Crisis was a case of the frog in the pot being boiled who at one point notices an unusual temperature-jump, sees the flabby finger of a dour woman turning up the heat, and asks in his frog-voice, “Hey, what’s going on here?”

The SD itself is no more capable of solving the problem than the frog, though it may stir up quite a fuss and splash around a little. No, actually, let’s update the metaphor. There are multiple frogs in the pot. The pot is Sweden. The frogs are the political forces in Sweden, parties and nonparty political forces. SD is the frog who gets upset and starts making a fuss. The others are annoyed at this malcontent frog. Just enjoy the water, you bigot. What’s wrong with that malcontent wrong? Let’s shun him to one side of the pot. Now there is born a small and weak but feisty little frog named AfS who seeks to jump over the side and shut off the flame, but isn’t strong enough to jump that high, and the fat-and-happy bigger frogs might seek to stop him if he does grow big enough.

The reality

To return to the Sweden election results. In the foreign headline-summarized version of events, all the above was reduced to: the “far-right” SD “won” the election.

The unnuanced view that SD “won” (and that SD is “far-right”) is wrong for several reasons. For one thing, the SD will have neither the prime ministership nor any of the cabinet positions (ministries). All the cabinet positions go to members of the Center-Right coalition, by agreement, which represents a nod by the Center-Right to the old gods of the cordon-sanitaire. The SD gets no control of any ministries but under a gentleman’s agreement the new ministries are to pursue policies significantly more moderate on key questions behind the crisis of the West than previously. This is believed to include reduction of migration totals, refugee policy, and nationality/citizenship-granting policy. Possibly Sweden will even deport some fraudulent refugees and criminal migrants.

The new ministers are all sworn in and official as of October 18, 2022. It was a strange in the annals of political history in such parliamentary systems that a party giving more than four-tenths of the necessary votes to bring forward a new government gets no ministries at all. (SD has 73 seats; the Center-Right coalition has 103 seats, the Center-Left has 173 seats. The new government received exactly 176 votes when the new parliament met, as expected.)


Nyans vs. AfS

In some ways the more interesting story in the Sweden election is the comparison of the two radical, ideological minor-parties, Nyans and AfS. Both parties are small, only recently formed, but have coherent total-visions of a political program. They are not single-issue or ‘joke’ parties; they are quite morally serious). They are also new. This is AfS’ second election and Nyans‘ first.

Nyans are immigrant-supremacists, soft-Islamicists, anti-European racialists. Their support is hard-capped at the level of Non-Western Migrants-turned-voters.

AfS, as Swedish-ethnonationalists, have a much higher potential cap, within the native Swedish or European (pro-European) population.

For a time the AfS used this slogan: “Which Sweden will you choose?” (“Vilket Sverige valjer du?“). The black flag of ISIS on the right hosts the logos of the seven big parties inside the white circle. The message: All these parties, of the Center-Left and Center-Right, they are all guilty, tainted, part of the problem, and without solutions or real vision.

The seven symbols on the black flag are the logos of all the major political parties, except one: the SD.

We are not talking about big numbers of voters, but we are talking about ig ideas and visions. Every rational voter for Nyans or AfS knew well that his vote was “wasted,” that his vote would not contribute to any actual seats in the parliament given the “4%-hurdle.” These two parties, AfS and Nyans, therefore represent ideological-cores of movements or political-currents, activist bases.

If they were magically teleported outside the electoral-ghetto, both Nyans and AfS could immediately grow to 10x, 15x, or 20x what their voting-strength was in election 2022, and would be set to grow further from there. If the Center-Left coalition parties move away from support for Migrants, expect parties like Nyans to continue to become active, even if this particular one goes away. If SD fails to turn things around for Sweden as some of its voters may have hoped, expect the AfS or a party like it to continue to attract momentum. Because the new SD-influenced government will not likely turn thing around, To the AfS belongs the political future.

Some say that now that SD is “in the system,” the door will be open for the growth of the AfS (or party like it). The system hopes SD can be coopted and that whatever radicalism there still is with the party can be contained and subsumed. Being a quasi-part of government does indeed put a lot of pressure on the SD to soften even further than it already has.

The leadership of AfS are not people inclined to soften or compromise. They are smart, sharp, hungry, and young. The b.1970s age-cohort among them are the elders of the group. The most common leader figures that emerged when the party was born in the late 2010s were are b.1980s and even b.1990s. One of their more prominent members is Jeff Ahl (b.1987). He was a former SD member of the parliament who left to co-found AfS. Their national-leader, Gustave Kasselstrand, is also b.1987. The party treasurer is b.1986. Other senior party members are born in the early 1990s.

The departure of some key SD figures to form the AfS in the late 2010s symbolized the softening line of the SD. The SD in its infancy was a lot like AfS is today, young men with an ideological commitment to liberation from the multiculturalist-monster. in the SD’s infancy the multicultural-machine was still in its own early stages, and every Swedish adult remembered well a fully-monoethnic Sweden. This is no longer the case. Young adults now grew up in an environment of multicultural-Sweden.

The AfS’ call for mass repatriations and for a firm policy promoting peaceful repatriation among migrants and preventing new migrants from arriving is a radical divergent vision from both regime policy and from the Nyans vision of Sweden as a permanent Migrant flophouse with some second-class tax-cow Swedes to keep the money flowing to first-class-citizen Migrants and Muslims.

As for Nyans, you will not be surprised to learn that its leader is a migrant himself, name of Mikail Yüksel, b.1982 in Turkey, an arrival in Sweden in 2001. On arrival, the then-teenager claimed to be a refugee, and was “waved in” according to the custom of the time. Whatever story he came up with held up enough to get him permanent residency. After that was secured, he began frequently traveling back and forth to Turkey.

Nyans is too new a party to have much of a leadership class. I expect the people behind it (like the “refugee” founder who frequently travels back to the place he had to “flee”) are b.1980s and b.1990s, just as with AfS. The younger Migrants with significant experience in Sweden are imbued with a doctrine of their own moral superiority, which the political-culture preaches. In both cases, the b.2000s people soon to join them as they age-in to politics as the 2020s go forward.

That both AfS and Nyans are youth-driven parties and outsiders allows them a purity of purpose, allows them to face the issues of today head on. Moral-right is on the side of the AfS, of course. Sweden really does belong, by right, to the Swedes and not to the mishmash coalition of migrants and Muslims. (Echoes of the “Somewheres” vs. the “Anywheres” distinction. These Migrants had no reason specifically to go to Sweden except that it offered lots of benefits and waved them in.)

The Nyans party, since its founding, has also been promoted by Turkey’s state-run news agency. Some want to cast Nyans as a pro-Erdogan in some sense (“Pro-Erdogan Islamist party in Sweden sparks concerns,” Nordic Monitor, Sept. 12, 2022). Its broad appeal to migrants in hardcore-immigrant-majority areas is its message of immigrant-supremacism, and many of its voters, I presume, don’t care about Erdogan. Some might, but to focus on Erdogan may miss the point a bit.

The following are all words that to some degree describe Nyans: non-European, anti-European, immigrant-triumphalist, immigrant-supremacist, pro-Black, pro-Muslim, pro-“Middle East North African” (MENA), anti-Swedish or post-Swedish, anti-Christian or post-Christian (the latter not in the liberal-humanist sense), multiculturalist. More passive forms of most of these same ideas are perfectly okay with the regime.

The Nyans party platform (list of demands) and cast-of-characters is lifted from some Jean Raspail or Michel Houellebeq novel. If Jean Raspail wrote other novels picturing a Migrant takeover of Europe, especially by the 2010s (he died in 2020), Raspail might have eventually come up with something like a Nyans party. His successor in the genre, Houllebecq, did depict a Nyans-like party very directly in his Submission novel, and predicted its success, as what force in European politics would or could block such a party?

Taken from the Nyans platform:

  • “The Nyans party demands that Muslims and Afro-Swedes be given a special minority status in Sweden’s constitution.”
  • “The Nyans party demands that Islamophobia be given a special criminal classification.”

The party also calls for:

  • segregation of certain public facilities according to Islamic custom;
  • special housing, partly- and fully-subsidized, to be given to immigrants persecuted by racism in Sweden;
  • hate-crimes offices to seek out and punish White-racists and Islamophobes who target first- or second-generation Migrants (i.e., to ensure the domestic tranquility by crushing native-Racism).

A number of the top candidates for Nyans made quasi-ISIS-style public comments hostile to Jews and Shia-Muslims. Be that as it may, every person in this party is hostile to the eternal plague of White Racism which daily torments and humiliates all first-, second-, and third-generation Migrants in Sweden.

The Nyans policy platform would create a first-tier of citizens consisting of glorious noble Migrants; a second-class of citizen being undiverse, boring ethnic-Swedes; and a third class of citizen or sub-citizen being Racists, with the hate-crimes panels able to demote an individual from second-class to third-class as needed. The ‘endgame’ is a Sweden purged of the curse of Swedishness and inherited by Migrants.


The Gender Gap

Sweden has a political “gender gap,” in that SD support was more more male than female. It is a familiar problem, much commented on in the U.S. case, but I think generally applicable across the West.

The phenomenon is based on an emergent identity-group of empowered left-wing educated women. Society trains them to believe they are the natural leadership class and that there is a long-running conspiracy by men against them, something like that. They drink this up and come to who base their identity and sense of self on a left-wing politics of grievance and of self-empowerment. It doesn’t really lead them to happiness, and it may resemble some huge political cult akin to a self-help organization. To call back briefly to the Merkel Migrant Crisis, these are the women who held up the “Refugees Welcome” signs.

Exit polls suggest that 29% of ethnic-Swedish men voted SD, against only about 18% of Swedish women. Meanwhile, party-preference surveys in 2020 and 2022 found 23% of men say they prefer SD against only 10% of women. If the exit polls were right, it suggests more women than men concealed their party-preference if it was for SD, suggesting the taboo against the SD is felt more strongly by women than men.


The future of Swedish politics

We can say that “Nyans vs. AfS” to to be the future of Swedish politics. Make that, all Western politics. Make that a ‘future’ already with us. All our politics already has this divide running through it somewhere, though the regimes across the West implicitly favor the Nyans side, even though mostly they just pretend that it will always be the way it was no matter how many Migrants are added and empowered.

What “Nyans vs. AfS” represents is an in-the-open conflict over the question of whether European Man is the rightful owner of Europe, or whether Migrants are morally-superior after all, and a holy replacement of the deplorable European. Will a mishmash of Muslims and Blacks and Whoevers inherit the continent, cheered on by a class of native anti-racism Experts, these often being female and radical-feminists (see: Robin DiAngelo and Heidi Beirich).

Migrants reigning supreme, formally, legally, and explicitly explicitly by the State, which exists to serve them. That is the Nyans vision. The reverse is the AfS vision, in which Nyans supporters and most other Migrants would be put on a Path to Repatriation. Only one side shall win.

To reformulate AfS’ own slogan previously mentioned: Which side are you on?



The results: Lower Saxony, Germany

Lower Saxony, although almost as big as Sweden (in population) and although the only election in Germany in 2022, the Lower Saxony state election in October 2022 got little attention in foreign media coverage. I did not even see it mentioned in U.S. media coverage.

A similar general story can be told as with the Sweden election with the AfD in the place of SD. If the AfD is on the SD’s path, it is at an earlier stage in Lower Saxony. If we apply the “20/20 rule” proposed above, the AfD breakthrough could come in the early 2030s at earliest.

I mentioned the AfD already above in the context of the Merkel Migrant Crisis, which I believe is in important ways the key political event of the 2010s.

The AfD is the equivalent of the Sweden Democrats in Sweden in important ways. The AfS, when it founded itself in the late 2010s, copied the AfD’s name, but is actually a considerably more hardcore and purist revivalist party, equivalent to the ethnonationalist wing of the AfD, which is a minority position within the AfD.

The AfD polled as high as 18% Germany-wide in the late 2010s, which could mean that in a crisis and with the cards falling just right it could have taken one-fourth the seats in a Bundestag election, which would be a deep humiliation for the Berlin regime. The AfD, though, sank to much lower during the Corona-Panic period from March 2020 through mid-2022, usually coming in below 10% during the long Panic, and not doing much better than that in the actual Bundestag election of September 2021. It lost up to half its peak support.

What happened is the Corona-Panic drove less-committed voters towards the safety of support for the government and the ‘regime’ parties. (A lesson: governments in some cases love manageable crises; one is reminded of the old line about government programs being “a solution in search of a problem”).

In September and October 2022, the AfD has recovered almost all its pre-CoronaPanic strength, achieving 15% or better in a number of polls. This I can only interpret to be because the AfD is the main voice against intervention in the Ukraine war, and as long as Germany continues pigheadedly backing the US intervention, the AfD will continue to push towards its high-mark and maybe even exceed it, as winter gets closer. The AfD polling at a steady 20%+ would be deeply worrying to the Berlin regime.

The election Lower Saxony came on October 9th, 2022, right in the middle of this sustained recovery in strength by the AfD, and during the ongoing Ukraine war. Lower Saxony is not and never has been a stronghold for this party. During the Merkel Migrant Crisis, support rose to up to 10% in Lower Saxony but leveled off at about 7-8% and mostly stayed there.

The result in the Lower Saxony Landtag election, October 9, 2022:

  • 48%: Regime parties, Center-Left (SPD+Green)
  • 33%: Regime parties, Center-Right (CDU+FDP)
  • 11%: AfD — the only major opposition party
  • 5%: Other dissident or quasi-dissident parties, non-Regime, or anti-Regime (Linke, DieBasis, Freie Waehler, Volt) — (note, DieBasis is the “Corona-denier, anti-vaxx” party, and took 1.25% here). No one expected any of these would get seats, though Linke might have. Their function is more to make a statement.
  • 3%: Joke parties or single-issue parties

It turned out that the FDP didn’t make it over 5% and so didn’t get any seats. In actual seats it was SPD 57 seats, Greens 24 seats, CDU 47 seats, AfD 18 seats. Total seats in the new Landtag: 146. SPD+Greens are an easy majority at 81 seats between them (55%).

Overall there is not a major shift here. The change was the strong showing by the AfD and the shift within the Center-Left coalition from SPD to Greens.

As for the Ukraine War, we see in the AfD’s relatively good result (if not great result) a signal of discontent with interventionism and confrontationalism. In Sweden, SD flipped its position on NATO membership (Sweden has never been a member but is now ‘applying’) and in about spring 2022, and began saying they were for it. The AfS now holds the torch of opposition to NATO membership, which the SD used to carry. This is one example of how the SD softened its position.

The AfD benefits in one sense at least by being an opposition party, it can be more honest. SD may have flipped on NATO because it sensed a regime commitment to joining NATO and saw opinion poll s suggesting most Swedes were panicked over the Russia invasion of Ukraine, and knew the election was approaching and that they had a real shot at entering government. The whole deal might be off if they stuck to their non-NATO position. In Germany the AfD doesn’t have this dilemma, for now.

The AfD caused controversy among its own supporters when its Bundestag members appeared to support the Ukraine intervention in August 2022, interpreted by some as a cheap “virtue signal.” Nevertheless, some regular-citizen opponents of the Ukraine intervention will tend to migrate to the AfD, which is what I believe happened in this Lower Saxony election. It was not at all a big-enough movement to get attention or for the “transastlantic” crowd to even notice.

Germany’s problems are considerably bigger than the mere energy problem, and it is unclear if anyone has the solution.


Population comparisons and brief comments on the ethnopolitical situation



Titular-nationality population: ca. 8 million (“Swedes”), persons of either full-Swedish background or part-Swedish and part-close-kindred, fully assimilable background.

Others: ca. 2.5 million

Of the 2.5 million others (non-Swedes), there are said to be over 250,000 of Syrian origin alone, primarily tracing their ‘lineage’ to the Merkel Migrant Crisis of 2015-16. That is up from <50,000 on the eve of the Merkel Migrant Crisis, and up from a low number basically roundable to zero in the 1980s.

By the 1990s, small and secure-seeming beach-heads had been established by this group and others. Similar stories hold for other migrant-groups, with slight changes in chronologies between them. Somalis may number 125,000 today; Iraqis number about 230,000. Turks and Kurds are also in that league, including the founder and leader of the anti-white political party Nyans. Many other groups of non-Europeans have significant numbers in the mid-high tens of thousands.

A small majority of the 2.5 million non-Swedes is non-Western and unassimlable. They often form themselves into that now-recognizable sight, the immigrant “no-go zone” ghetto on the outer fringes of a large city, dependent on “handouts” and regime support and left-wing pressure groups to demand they stay and get kid-glove treatment and handouts. One of the most notorious of these immigrant-dominated areas outside Stockholm is Rinkeby, which by the 2000s had almost totally de-Europeanized. Initial beachheads by migrants and ‘refugees’ were established y the end of the 1980s, and in the 1990s they took the whole place ad Migrants kept coming in. Somalis are the largest group in Rinkeby. Why are they in Sweden? I have no idea.

Rinkeby was near the 90% foreign-origin mark already by the year 2000. Since then, many more Rinkebys or semi-Rinkebys exist, and we stand at the cusp of Rinkebys being the semi-norm in Sweden rather than strange aberrations or out-of-the-way curiosities. Since 2000, the concept of the immigrant-suburb has become a wider phenomenon and almost a cliche in our (Western) political commentary (see also, the banlieue in France). Similar such conditions exist in modified form in the USA, despite occasional references one still hears to the “inner city,” which in many places or in many ways is an anachronism now.

Rinkeby’s vote in 2022, according to a preliminary result: Social Democrats: 30%; Vänsterpartiet (“Party of the Left”): 28%; other parties of the leftist coalition: 8% (total Center-Left, 66%); Nyans: 24%; Center-Right coalition: 8%; Sweden Democrats: 2%.

In the “Rinkeby”-comparable immigrant-supermajority districts outside major cities of Malmo and Gothenburg, Nyans did about the same, taking over one-fourth of the vote.

It would be a mistake to assume all of the 2.5 million of the non-Swedes in Sweden are of the “Rinkeby” type, — i.e. unassimilable, hostile, non-Western, Mideast or African Muslims, inhabiting ghetto’s designated “no-go zones,” whose young men pelt police with rocks for fun while the more ambitious of their number doing bombings, murders, and rapes.

Nyans‘ low total vote (0.44%) is partly because so many of its core supporters are not (“yet”?) voting-eligible citizens but also partly because these hardcore non-Swedish areas are not necessarily the norm.

A portion of the 2.5 million non-Swedes in Sweden are easily assimilable to Sweden in its traditional sense, in the sense universally recognizable of what Sweden was before it built this Migrant pipeline. The definitely-unassimilable element may now exceed 15% of total resident population. The fully-assimilable or the transient-neighbor population (as with Danes, Norwegians, Finns) may reach 4-5%; a gray-area element is another 4-5%.

Sweden has had below-replacement fertility rates since 1968, usually in the 1.75 children/woman range over 55 years now, perhaps more like 1.65 for Swedes. Adjusting for people living longer, still we would expect fewer Swedes today than in 1968 when fertility dropped below replacement. The absolute drop should especially have been felt by the 1990s or so, and every year since. Instead, in the past 25 years Sweden has added nearly 1.7 million residents, a nearly +20% population growth. The Merkel Migrant wave and the chain-migrants that followed directly from it were only as a bump in the long-running trend, say four years’ worth of Migrants dumped in the space of one year.

As we consider this part of Sweden’s story, it seems inevitable that a Sweden Democrat-like political breakthrough would occur, and it is just as predictable that an AfS-like breakthrough will come, will continue in the 2020s.



Titular population (“Germans”): ca. 6.7 million.

Others: 1.4 million.

Of the others, about 400,000 have gained German citizenship (the core of this being Turks), and about 900,000 are foreign citizens.

Of the foreign citizens, around 150,000 of the Merkel Migrant Wave of 2015-16, and by now it must be that a portion of the remainder are chain-migrants from the 150,000 of the Merkel Wave who have stayed.

In 2022, reportedly more than 100,000 Ukrainians are being hosted as golden-ticket ‘refugees’ in Lower Saxony, are officially resident there, and are being funded by tax-monies. Persistent rumor has it that these Ukrainians are often not really ‘resident’ in the place they are registered and go from place to place (including back to Ukraine) but make sure to do just enough to keep the money flowing.

By contrast: The number of Ukrainians arriving in 2022 said to be resident in Sweden as of September 2022 is “only” 45,000. The share of the total resident-population of recently arriving Ukrainians in Lower Saxony is 1.3%; in Sweden, it is “only” 0.4%.

In general the same provisos as discussed for Sweden hold in Lower Saxony’s case, except that the native demographic-momentum situation is worse and the proportion of recent-foreigners is lower (except Ukrainians).


This entry was posted in politics and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

27 Responses to The elections of 2022 in Sweden (nationwide) and Germany (Lower Saxony): Sweden’s AfS vs Nyans a preview of battles to come

  1. Dieter Kief says:

    Great anaylsis of an interesting triangle indeed consisting of the Nyans Muslim party, the immigrant critical SD and the Swedish enthonationalistic AfS. Thx. Mr. Hail!
    Btw.: Is the AfS also – as the SD – part of the Corona-panic movement?

    You wrote two things about the Swedish women I want to comment on:

    1) “Sweden has a political “gender gap,” in that SD support was more male than female. It is a familiar problem, much commented on in the U.S. case, but I think generally applicable across the West.”

    2) “The phenomenon is based on an emergent identity-group of empowered left-wing educated women.Society trains them to believe they are the natural leadership class and that there is a long-running conspiracy by men against them, something like that.”

    Looking at 1) The anthropological fact that women are made to raise kids /to be beneficial to kids is also at play here. And I think that this is a major driving force behind their reluctance towards the critique of immigrants – not least if they have lots of kids – as the muslims do. Women tend to be for all kinds of kids wholeheartedly – men are experienced with the cuckoo’ egg problem and thus naturally / biologically more on the lookout for troubles in this regard.

    N. 2)  is driven not only by feminism, but also by postmodernism/ deconstructivism. Btw.: It might even be a bit overlooked how much postmodernism/ deconstructivism here and feminism and traditional leftism (emancipation!) there spring from the same well and reinforce one another. The main common denominator is: Being unprincipled  and against hierarchies (hierarchies as a stand in for: Power structures).

    This is part of an ongoing  long debate: The left’s critique of religion and its anarchism play also a role here. – Even the secularised forms in which religious ideas were popularized. – – The social state as the land where milk and honey flow – for all of God’s children… and the finally de-hierarchised (=purified****) world without borders and without religion even and without any obstacles to – freedom****, that the Beatles’ Imagine is praising/ idealizing / evocating – preaching about kind of…Or The Plastic Ono Band’s Give Peace a Chance. –

    – Mix that with a little bit of bitterness and you have cancel culture and – the Mason-gang’s hippie version of Gnosticism… The Blavatsky-Dostojewski-Gogol-Hippie-stream of creepy consciousness (see T. Coraghesan Boyle’s very good LSD novel Inside Looking Out). – – – The dark realm luring under every romantic/utopian longing once those lose humor, freshness, playfulness, transcendentalism, goofiness even that often times start them… In short: All these light-hearted attitudes that characterize(d) the charme of utopias and romanticism (of the hippiedom… –

    – See Once Upon a Time in the West (a great movie, btw…. – and see: ****Purity by Jonathan Franzen, which is a great novel – as is Freedom – and – – Franzen went on to look at Christianity in his latest (Robert-Johnson not least) novel Crossroads.
    (Btw.: Jonathan Franzen has firm Swedish family ties. Btw. II – What Jonathan Franzen does not get as good as his colleague David Guterson in his novel Our Lady of the Forest is what Achmed E. Newman pointed out in his review of Guterson’s book on Peak Stupidity: The feminist aspects of the visionary (catholic, not least…) frenzy that is taking place there in the US’ west’s northern woods – and how it gives the regular guy there a hard time… David Guterson shows indeed how tightly knit together mass culture, feminism, utopianism and the visionary (= the romantic…) side of – Christianity are. – – – –

    • Hail says:

      “Is the AfS also – as the SD – part of the Corona-panic movement?”

      From what I saw from their key spokesmen and leaders in 2020, they were typical Corona-Anti-Panickers. Their perspective was that lockdowns are a crime against the nation. As this was not much of a political issue there, they didn’t talk about it much.

      A key to understand, I think, about the AfS is they are young and they are ideological-purists. They do not do cheap demagoguery, as so many fell into in 2020 over a flu virus. SD has been seriously tempted by power for years and the usual result follows.

    • Hail says:

      On the AfS vs. SD on the Corona-Panic, see also below.

      Further responses to your thoughtful comment in about 12 hours.

    • Hail says:

      You are no doubt correct about the biological instincts of women, but I believe a class-formation process has occurred among a large portion of White women in the West. It started in the third quarter of the 20th century or so, and was completed and ‘mature’ by the first quarter of the 21st century, and is now almost cliche to observe. It’s obvious and easy to spot (although few use the word “class” to identify it).

      This class-formation process draws from instinct, circumstance, cultural and economic conditions, and more things still, it applies a thick layer of ideology, and waits for a few decades. The end-result transcends all the components that went into it. This “class-formation” process has created something new, which cannot be reduced to any of its parts.

      This is where Marxist theory may be helpful. The basic argument or insight of the Marxists or ideological-Socialists was that (1.) “class” exist (or, classes exist) and (2.) classes have world-historical political importance and can shape things like culture, politics, and economics, and the worldviews of classes shape destiny and possibilities.

      What is a ‘class’? A mere way to state average-income with words rather than numbers? It is not that. It cannot be that. It is something more towards the spiritual. The old Marxists spoke of “class consciousness” in a way similar to how Christians would speak of coming to Christ and living a Christian life.

      Classes can be formed, exist, and dissolve, after which new classes emerge.

      My proposal is that in the West a certain subset of (White-Western) women now view themselves as a class, even if they wouldn’t use that word, and act in the way Marxists would predict a privileged class would act, to protect its interests. This is indeed a “postmodern” form of class, and to me a decidedly negative one.

      • Dieter Kief says:

        Mr. Hail wrote: “What is a ‘class’? A mere way to state average-income with words rather than numbers? It is not that. It cannot be that. It is something more towards the spiritual.”

        Mr. Hail – you’re right, of course, this women consciousness/ emancipation  thing has also a spiritual side to it – in the same way, Marxism had it (remember, that Marxism was not only about the emancipation of the suppressd masses (proletriat, peasants, slaves…), but also about the emancipation of women. And Marxism was a spiritual movement not least (close, – at times indistinguishable from dark gnosticism (see Manès Sperber – Like a Tear in the Ocean, but see also the work of Belarussian writer Svitlana Alexievich (Nobel prize winner  2015).  – – I mentioned that stuff earlier hinting not least at Dostojewski, Madame Blavatsky, Nicolai Gogol – and I could add: Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch (Spirit of Utopia (Geist der Utopie, 1918), Atheism in Christianity (1968). Btw.: When Ernst Bloch appeared on the intellectual  scene in Heidelberg 1918 ff. Max Weber said, there’d be a young revolutionary in the salons lately, who has the habits and self consciousness of an old testament prophet (Weber would later write quite a bit about politics and charisma… – and about capitalist (=successful…) economy and – – – protestantism…).

        That said, I want to point out that I’ve said all that above already – and gave some examples too. Let me make it even more explicit, what it means, what I wrote above: To destroy functioning hierarchies and establish a woke army kinda – that gets government money aplenty in the West by now and – that made its way through corporate America (the Corporate old West too) – such a movement is not least powerful – and it would not work without its spiritual side – and it is strongly rooted in both: Wokism and – feminism.

        ((I smile – we debate about the table of contents of the book of/about our times. And: We are talking about a view on the whole of the present society (= we’re talking about the realm, the novel did traditionally conquer (see my hints at Dostojewski and Gogol and Guterson and Franzen above – I will add Thomans Mann’s Magic Mountain (also a medical frenzy***** at the brink of war to say the least – – – and Dr. Faustus. Dr. Faustus, because of the way it makes use of JWv Goethes (and the European peoples’ … ) Faust (Faust is an old European wandering legend – Goethe came across – and made perfect use of…). We all still live in this legend (or. to make this super short: In Goethe’s poem The Sorcerer’s Apprentice. The basic discovery of all those texts about us modern human beings: We are, but we don’t have us (This is the motto of Bloch’s collected works).

        My point with women and immigration is not to say we are doomed because women tend to have  a weak spot concerning the survival of – all kinds of kids.My point is more that of the enlightenment (=old school) thinker: These are the things we’d better understand, if we want to understand what’s going on.

        To make this thing here very short in the end: I now think of PM in spe Giorgia Meloni (Italy) and – PM Mette Frederiksen (Denmark) (who have more in common than most people are aware of – or would risk to mention…). – Both are women thinking in the enlightenment framework, I’d hold. The branding of them as left and right is a tricky subject – but very interesting (and a sign of hope, not least)).

        The next very short remark is about Hans Magnus’ Enzensberger’s 1500 words short open letter to his (imagined) friend Balthasar in his essay collection Politische Brosamen (published in 1982 – a look back at the revolutionary (= heavily Marxist sixties) ). He explains to Balthasar how a secularized Apocalyptical thinking has taken hold of him, and that Balthasar does notunderstand hwo strongly he is cptiavated in these ages old apocalptic traditions; (now think of Covid – and even more: Think of climate change… – and how both drive the Woke in their futile attempt to find innerwordly redemption and/or release.  I’d argue that these two subjects gained their stronghold of/ their power over the (woke=Western liberal)  public sphere not least, because they are place holders for all the things that would have been better debated in – novels**** (and other works of fiction like movies etc.)  and taken care of – in Churches****.

        One of the great obstacles to this idea is (and I know this from up close) – that not least the christian preachers and ministers ect. lean more towards the Corona/climate/Russia panic and wokism than – towards their core tasks these days. It will be interesting to see how Christianity reacts to Giorgia Meloni’s and Mette Frederiksen’s immigration critical politics. Giorgia Meloni made not only the feminist, but also the Christian aspect of her politics explicit in furious speeches – and that worked surprisingly and perfectly well for her. But this is Italy. The Pope lives there – since ages…

        **** both the novel and religion, look at and/or deal with life (& death) as a whole. Thomas Mann and Jürgen Habermas did write their biggest books as old men: About the Christian roots of European thinking: This Too a History of Philosophy (and Religion…) and The Joseph’s Tetralogy: Jospeh and His Brothes – about the Old Tetsament…

        • Hail says:

          “PM Giorgia Meloni (Italy) and – PM Mette Frederiksen (Denmark) …are women thinking in the enlightenment framework, I’d hold. The branding of them as left and right is a tricky subject…”

          We learn lately that Meloni supported the digital vaccine-pass system, and the Danish PM aggressively supported Lockdowns early on (though then appeared to apologize to the nation for it).

          • Dieter Kief says:

            Mr. Hail wrote:
            “We learn lately that Meloni supported the digital vaccine-pass system, and the Danish PM aggressively supported Lockdowns early on (though then appeared to apologize to the nation for it).”

            Gorgia Meloni acts a lot like Mette Frederiksen does – with regard to he Covid passport too (includingher corrections of her former positions).

            Looking at the results as presented by top science twitterers Robert Pezer and Orwell2024 Denmark is doing fine (see below for details):

            Robert Pezer (@rpezer1) / Twitter

            Btw.: I look each week into Pezer’s and Orwell2024’s new findings- highly recommended.

            Today, Pezer has a new look by a Scandinavian epidemiologist into the Scandinavian Covid data – and links to a research paper that claims that they’d have clear indications, that the use of Facebook increases depression amongst students – and especially amongst those most vulnerable to mental problems. – 

            Then the chilly winds blew down
            Across the desert
            Through the canyons of the coast
            To the Malibu
            Where the pretty people play
            Hungry for power
            To light their neon way
            Give them things to do

            (Eagles – The Last Resort (in Hotel California – the Mission Bells are ringing – but nobody seems to hear…).  

            Closer Covid look at Denmark

            Denmark did well if we look at the pandemic years behind us – and Robert Pezer and Orwell2024 (I’ve both linked here too before) show that in minute statistical details. Denamrk is overall low on coercion and did very good economically and fairly well medically. The Swedish top-checker Covid-duo Tegnell/Giesecke and their Danish counterparts (Niels Hoiby and Christine Stabell-Benn) did great work – and: This is the Christian high trust tradition: People were willing to follow “their” experts – sooner (in the case of Hoiby’s vaccine intervention – to aspirate the syringe – right away – in the case of Stabell-Benns warnings about the shortcomings of the vaccines and other “warning signs” a bit later – but they did.
            – And they did stop the mandatory PCR testing following the protests of a one(!)-parliamentarian outsider party’s initiative, which took this case to court – and won – – – ). Working democracy…
            google this short english spoken vid:

            Denmark Stop Tirany of PCR Test : : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

            (This vid has had a total of 16 views by now… – some three of them by me – and maybe another five or so by people who know about it from me – these are the times of the miracles and wonders….).

            You’re right, Mette Frederiksen spoke about the mistakes that have been made in Denmark   – and apologized – as did the influential Danish Newspaper Extra Bladet (I’ve quoted their excuse before on Mr. Hail’s blog. Here is an English article about that:

            Danish newspaper apologizes for ‘hypnotically’ following gov’t narrative on COVID: ‘We failed’ – LifeSite (

            (There is a – novel about that stuff too – great one, btw., written by Scandinavian rooted and born Missourian Jonathan Franzen: .T.h.e. .C.o.r.r.e.c.t.i.o.n.s. (one of the key sentences in this book: Mistakes have been made. – – – – – I do think that this is quite Christian too, because the Christian value system includes individual failures – and ways to come to grips with those (maybe that is an aspect that Joseph Henrich and Jürgen Habermas in their great anthropological (Henrich) and philosophical/theological (Habermas) looks back at the European Christian/economical/ societal/spiritual development underestimate: How hard it is to admit mistakes – and how important (and how valuable) it is to look into them even though. Seen from this point of view of civilizational (Christian/European) achievements, Franzen’s novel shines even more. bottom line here: – To .f.o.r.g.i.v.e. is one perfectly good way to prepare /make – (necessary) Corrections.

            With regard to Pezer’s and orwell2024’s great statistical work, I want to add this – :When it comes to statistical analyses, I (much) prefer German stat expert Walter Krämer and the GB Prof. Norbert Fenton over El Gato Malo. The latter is weak on the restriction side of the prediction business (he does not see very clearly the natural, so to speak (= the methodological/scientific, basically) boundaries that his models incorporate (= represent))).
            In this contxt – see the new documentary about John Ioannidis (linked on twitter by Michael Levitt). In it, John Ioannidis says he had a close look into the apocalyptical Covid-vaccination pedictions, and says they present no valid data.
            (I would love to see a comparison of John Joannidis’ and Christine Stabell-Benn’s*** Covid-vaccine risk-benfit analysis

            ***Stabell-Benn’s is (cum grano salis) also Martin Kulldorff’s position – see his Brownstone article in praise of Stabell-Benn’s work about her Covid-vaccine risk-benefit analyses.
            The bottom line of Stabell-Benn’s work is: Post Omicron, there is no good reason to keep up mass vaccinations to protect against Covid.

  2. Good morning, Mr. Hail, Mr. Kief, and other readers:

    Unlike you and, even more so, PS commenter Ganderson, I have no Swedish ancestry. That doesn’t mean this isn’t an important story to me though. In all of western Europe, if you were around in the mid 1980s (I went there in the last ’80s myself), Sweden – maybe Scandinavia in general – would be the LAST place you could imagine having a 10% population share of hard-core foreigners!

    I mean, Germany had the Turks as guest workers (idiots) starting way back – early 60’s, but Dieter could tell us. France had their former colony residents that were to be let to immigrate. (Don’t ask me why that must necessarily be the case!)

    The Swedes had no earthly reason to do something this stupid, other than large-scale naivety and pathological, suicidal altruism.

    I’ll write more later on, but I appreciate your detailed take on the election. I assume you’ve read it, but Harri Honkanan, a Finn(?) who occasionally reports for VDare wrote a pretty optimistic article about the Swedish election results: Revolution In Sweden: Immigrant Patriot Sweden Democrats Effectively In Power. (VDare in general has very optimistic writers!)

    • Hail says:

      Thank you for this Hokanen/Vdare link, which I had not seen yet. I see it’s published the same day as this and covers much of the same ground.

      My own analysis or contribution is in a different direction, though, looking past SD and onto the real political struggle between opposing ideological camps represented by “Nyans” and AfS. These are two definitely minor parties, but each represents something MUCH bigger, each has a comprehensive vision, and only one of the two visions will win in the end.

      Generally, neither Nyans nor AfS are going to be even mentioned in this kind of overview (and I see the Hokanen article mentions neither). But the contrast is the very center of my analysis here.

  3. Hail says:

    Peak Stupidity wrote:

    “Sweden – maybe Scandinavia in general – would be the LAST place you could imagine having a 10% population share of hard-core foreigners!”

    I believe the “hard-core foreigners” as of 2022 stand at 15% of total resident population of all ages and conditions and citizenships. Their voting strength is less because many are foreigners. The other 9% of foreigners are approximately equally divided between assimilable foreigners [e.g., a Norwegian or Finn in Sweden is not a true foreigner] and judgement-call cases which some would say are assimilable and others not.

    The 15% total-population number for non-European foreigners may mean around 20% of the younger-age population are such. That is for Muslims, Blacks, and others of such types.

    Considering there are still many areas where one finds few-to-none of such people, it means that in areas where their presence is seen, the non-Western foreigners can have an average of around a one-third share of the working-age and youth populations.

    The places with the highest vote-share for SD are places not in, but just adjacent to such areas. Those Swedes who deal with the notorious Migrant mega-ghetto Malmo voted SD at rates close to one-third. (I specifically refer to the northern districts of Skane region.) When you see these stories in the news of crimes or bombings or murders in Sweden or riots and mass-attacks on police, it’s often Malmo. Nyans did very well in the core of the Migrant-controlled districts in Malmo…

  4. Hail says:

    My earliest commentary on these pages on the AfS vs. SD is here, published when the AfS was brand new in mid-2018 and the SD was a ‘mature’ and ‘major’ party gaining steady support:

    (from post: “Sweden in the World Cup, 2018, 91% White and No Muslims”; I took the team’s high degree of Europeanness as a possible metaphor for why the problem persists — it’s not visible enough to enough people.)

    I think that brief analysis from 2018 holds up well.

  5. Hail says:

    Some Corona-commentary from 2021 in the comments of the “All Life-Years Matter” post, on opposition parties in Sweden, specifically AfS vs. SD, and their attitudes towards the Panic:

    The full comment and following discussion is worth returning to read if one has an interest in the subject of “SD vs. AfS on the Corona-Panic.”

  6. Dieter Kief says:

    The new conservative Swedish government: We have too many bloody shootings in ths country – we have to change course of our immigration policy

    Google: Statement of Government Policy –

    Sweden Democrats were in 2020 strictly against the liberal Covid policy of Anders Tegnell & Johan Giesecke:

    • Hail says:

      Sweden’s homicide rate is now 3x Norway’s, but Sweden’s rate (barely above 1 per 100k), is still very low by U.S. standards.

      Statistical lifetime chance of dying by homicide with current rates:

      – Sweden: 0.12%

      – Norway: 0.04%

      – White homicide rate in the safest U.S. states: 0.06% to 0.10%

      – Jamaica: 3.5%, one of the more notorious homicide-risky places in the world today.

      – Usual now for U.S. cities with high Black pop.-%: between 1% and (an astonishing) 5%… The worst exceeded 5%, implying a statistical 1-in-20 chance that your cause of death if you spend your entire life in the city will be homicide. (Caveat, it is unfair to make national-level comparisons with the very worst sub-regions of one country.)

      (See: White murder rates by state, 1960 vs. 2010.)

    • Hail says:

      I read a portion of the new prime minister’s introductory policy speech which you refer to:

      Statement of Government Policy delivered by Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson – 18 October 2022.”

      In some of it, he sounds like the kind of leader Sweden would need to lift itself out of this swamp of Migrants and ethnomasochistic government policy. But then falls back to a universalist position. It’s hard to guess what really happens now.

      I notice this cleverly worded line:

      “[P]rotection will be offered temporarily to those fleeing conflict or crisis in Sweden’s neighbourhood. Sweden’s asylum reception legislation will be adapted to ensure that it is not more generous than is required of any Member State under EU law.”

      Note: I point especially to the words “in Sweden’s neighbourhood.” That does not include Somalia, Syria, or any other Islamic, Mideast, or African region.

      Then I feel some non-specific bad “vibes” from this:

      “This is a government for everyone who makes an effort and wants to do the right thing – regardless of whether they have immigrated to Sweden or were born here. Over the years, people have come here bringing expertise, entrepreneurship and tax revenues. When integration into Swedish society works, a richer, more tolerant and successful society ensues. But we must never be tolerant of intolerance.”

      In another part of the speech, he enthusiastically praises NATO, bashes Russia for its illegal war against holy Ukraine, vows that Sweden will enter NATO and that no one can stop him.

  7. Eric says:

    Reblogged this on Calculus of Decay and commented:
    Thank you for this thorough overview, very helpful information

  8. Hail says:

    AfD rising strong

    The AfD’s strong performance in German opinion-polling continues.

    Unfortunately there are no elections scheduled for a long time. Bavaria and Hessen have state elections one year from now. Brandenburg and Saxony, the same, scheduled for summer 2024. The Bundestag can, if it wants, stay as it is until Sept. 2025!

    As of October 2022, in all the polls, the AfD is again near its highest-ever support levels. It had previously reached its high-water-marks at various points in the late 2010s, then during the Corona-Panic lost one-third to one-half its support with that weakness of support lasting by one measure from March 2020 to August 2022.

    The “Emnid” poll now puts the AfD at 16%, against 71-72% for the Regime parties [CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Green]. This means a 6% net shift from Regime parties to the AfD since the Sept. 2021 national election (at which time it was Regime parties @76.5%, vs. AfD @ 10%). The AfD’s all-time peak in the weekly “Emnid” poll came two times in mid-2018 at 17%.

    In each of the five eastern states, in elections held today the AfD would control between one-fourth and one-third of the seats, enough to cause a ‘tipping’ scenario similar to what happened with the Sweden Democrats. I discussed this scenario in the main post. It may take more time before German political culture allows this, but AfD success can force the issue.

    • Dieter Kief says:

      Mr. Hail wrote:
      “In each of the five eastern states, in elections held today the AfD would control between one-fourth and one-third of the seats, enough to cause a ‘tipping’ scenario similar to what happened with the Sweden Democrats.”

      The tipping scenario must not lead to much. I think the most important part is math here: As long as the regulars achieve around 50% they can do as they please. (See – France, but also Sweden).
      It’s interesting how big changes like those in Danish immigration politics happen sometimes half- conscious or almost by accident. And how much people prefer rather to keep quiet about that either. See the EU reactions to the Danish change – which is a big quietness – – and compare that to the EU reaction to Hungary’s Victor Orban. Now that I speak about that: A difference is, that Mette Frederiksen is a she, and Victor Orban a he… Baffling is also the reaction of the Socialist International and especially the German Social Democrats – – – quietness (in slightly different cirumstances, this would have led to a firestorm of opposition by the German comrades to the Danish policy very easily! – In fact, that’s what you would have expected to happen sincetheythrew out Thilo sarrazin for proposing .e.x.a.c.t.l.y. what Mette Frederiksen is doing now…But: Nothing.
      Very interesting silence.
      Another interesting thing: Still influential CDU oldtimer Wolfgang Schäuble spoke very softly lately about the AfD – this too caused no outrage – or even criticism.
      Very funny btw. I made Michael Klonovsky aware of this shift – and he did not react either…
      (Lots of politics seemingly happens – underground (in the half – conscious realm not least).

      • Hail says:

        I have for years thought about the problem of what I call the “Sickman of European Politics.” By that I refer to the entity called Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

        Some years ago, the solution suddenly occurred to me: Split it up.

        Nothing is written in stone that there must be a state-entity called “Bundesrepublik Deutschland” with those borders set in 1945 (by circumstance, by leftover-European-geopolitical considerations, and by the cruelty of Stalin). Germany was so long “an idea,” spread across many medium states, small states, and free cities, for a LOT longer than it was unified as the Political Sickman of Europe we recognize today.

        If the eastern states were independent, the most realistic scenario is that the AfD or some AfD-like party takes over the government and aligns with Hungary and such forces.

        I would not by shy to go so far as to say German Unification of 1990 was a mistake, speaking from the best interests of Europe and of the Germans themselves. It would have been better to have a second Germany with a government closer to the “Viktor Orban” type than what this system has been for thirty years. This seems a substantial minority position among Germans, too. I wonder how you would feel about it.

        That whole ‘tipping’ scenario I have in mind really primarily applies to the eastern states. Linke+AfD will often have the majority of the seats, which introduces the possibility of a shift like what we have just seen with the Sweden Democrats…

        • Dieter Kief says:

          I’d love to see Badenia ( 4,4 million inhabitants, Black Forest and beautiful medieval Freiburg, relaxed Karlsruhe and Heidelberg/Mannheim) joining Switzerland (8 million). Won’t happen. Same is true for the east.
          Steve Sailer wrote a few weeks ago, Gemany would not be allowed to let Ukraine down. I thought: Yeah, right.
          The greater mystery is: Where does this feeling originate?
          Now I’m very intersted to see, how well it might hold up if the situation sould turn grim (not quite there so far).
          Strong movement in the moment, to – talk Sahra Wagenknecht into the risk of the foundation of a new left wing party with a little bit more of a rational and a national agenda than her actual left wing party Die Linke, so to speak.
          Mighty Springer media like BILD and weLT are all in for that (spoiler: won’t happen either). The polls say, she’d succeed and have the chance to gain 10% for a start.
          The dream would be to weaken the AfD with the help of posh (and fairly bright) leftist Sahra Wagenknecht (a whopping 60% of AfD voters say they like her views). Btw.: She is married to Oskar Lafontaine – – – the man who left the Social Democrats and co-founded Die Linke, which is now in big turmoil, because their old SED (=GDR) voters – die, whereas the woke crowd is getting stronger and stronger and destroys what had been left of resorts of reason in this party (this was the reason for Oskar Lafontaine, to end his active membership in this party. Btw.: His farewll speech in the Landtag of Saarbrücken was a great speech about the situation in Russia (and Oskar Lafontaine referred wholeheartedly to – John Mearsheimers analysis…).

  9. Hail says:

    AfS praised by political-science professor

    Swedish political scientist Ulf Petaja has praised the AfS as a good example of politics working. The AfS is a coherent ideological party and the emergence of such a party, he says, can “benefit democracy.”

    Says Professor Petaja: “[The AfS] is an example of a party that succeeds in capturing voters who think a little differently than the traditional parties.” (Interview with Swedish broadcaster SVT, which is state-controlled publicly funded media).

    Professor Petaja is at the University of Halmstad in the region of Halland, Sweden. Halland is a rural region on the coast facing Denmark between Gothenburg an Malmo, both big cities with notorious Migrant mega-ghettoes. His comments came in an interview after it was revealed the AfS had become the strongest “extra-parliamentary” party in Halland (without representation in any local, regional, or national bodies).

    The AfS voting strength was only 548 voters in Halland (among a total population of 287,500 full-Swedish origin; 17,500 “hardcore foreigners,” i.e., the Nyans party constituency; and 45,000 other foreigners). But this is seen as a committed political cadre that is comprehensive-ideological in nature, and may continue to gain ground in the 2020s.

    The AfS, it is reported, is today larger in membership terms, more vigorous, and more committed an organization than were the Sweden Democrats in 2006, at the cusp of the SD’s own rise. The once-small SD’s political objective was partly achieved this year, apparently able to influence the government to reduced the long-standing Migrant Dumping policy, which suggests the AfS could match such an achievement by the 2030s.

  10. Dieter Kief says:

    The Whole Population is Talking About Immigration and We Talk About Nothing Else Because We Talk About it Every Day – Swedish Blogger Ivar Arpi in Conversation With Freddy Sayers of UnherdTV

  11. Peterike says:

    Western Europe is done, finished. Nothing at all will fix it. These political blips are meaningless. Europes future is non white. The cake is baked. Within 20 years Muslims will be tearing down the great cathedrals.

    • Hail says:

      People in 1913 assumed the same about their world.

    • Hail says:

      People in 1913 assumed the same about their world.”

      By this I mean: “Things will continue to go on forever as they are now, in a straight-line trajectory.”

      The seeds of the downfall of the world of 1913 were already present and observable by the 1880s. The movements that would replace the old world were active and in the field. But it took decades to actually play out, and it took the insanity and tragedy of the 1914-18 war to shake things out.

      The median educated observer of 1913 never would have guessed at the events of the next century, from the stupidity of a general-war in Europe for no reason to the Merkel Migrant Disaster one hundred years later, the mega-scale example of what European civilization had become one century later.

      Likewise, the movements and forces that will displace what is in place now, they are already in the field and active.

  12. Hail says:

    The AfD in Baden-Württemberg

    The latest poll for Germany’s southwestern state confirms again that the AfD is “back.” The Stuttgarter Zeitung conducted the poll Oct 20-25. The findings suggest the AfD in a stronger position than at any time since 2018.

    The numbers are still low, and certainly the AfD is still not able to challenge the Regime parties in this state. But the AfD’s staying-power is notable, given how many people have prematurely dug its grave since 2016.

    The poll results:

    55% of residents of Baden-Württemberg express support for one of the Regime parties. A larger number lean moderately towards the SPD+Green than the CDU+FDP side. As if the exact balance of the Regime parties matters much. (The difference is certainly accounted for by foreign-origin citizens, who have shown no willingness to create their own parties.)

    17% express support for minor parties outside the Regime. They are “outside” for either for being marginal in numbers or power, besides being unrepresented also being seen as unworthy of attention for one or more of these: (1.) not having a coherent agenda, (2.) being unreliable for being too independent, or (3.) (the important one) being ideologically suspect.

    The umbrella grouping, at about 17% of the popilation, includes all kinds of dissidents, single-issuers, and (in the gloomy early-2020s) also the Corona-opponents and their party. It includes, too, the several joke-party ‘supporters’ (if we can use that word). Most importantly, it includes several semi-non-Regime ideological parties and outright anti-Regime ideological parties or tendencies. The Regime in that country spends a great deal of its time working on undermining such elements and doing domestic propaganda to suppress the organized dissidents. The umbrella grouping of “politically engaged non-Regime-party supporters” is mostly now with the AfD (at 10% for AfD of the 17% for the whole umbrella grouping).

    28% of people have no intention to vote and are non-political or politically demoralized and, anyway, non-engaged. It can be assumed many of these would be potential AfD (or AfD-like party) supporters in a fair game. Their lack of any enthusiasm for the Regime parties is a statement in itself, but they see no hope of a political solution.

    In the election last year, the Stuttgarter Zeitung poll predicted the results for each party almost exactly. Their methodology was either very lucky or very good. Between 2016 and 2019, several poll found support for the AfD at 12-15% of the total population, which is higher than the current finding (10%). Some people who backed the AfD in the late 2010s have found new dissident homes, for now.

Leave a Comment

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s